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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to study the Bertrand duopoly example in the quantum domain. We use two
ways to write the game in terms of quantum theory. The first one adapts the Li–Du–Massar scheme for
the Cournot duopoly. The second one is a simplified model that exploits a two qubit entangled state. In
both cases, we focus on finding Nash equilibria in the resulting games. Our analysis allows us to take
another look at the classic model of Bertrand.
1 Introduction
Quantum game theory is an interdisciplinary field that combines game theory with quantum theory [1, 2, 3].
The idea is to use the apparatus developed to describe quantum phenomena to analyze macroscopic complex
systems (including living systems) [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The first attempt to describe a game in the quantum
domain applied to finite noncooperative games in the normal form [1, 2, 3] but soon after that quantum
game theory has found applications in various fields including decision sciences [5, 6, 9], finance theory
[10, 11, 12] or mathematical psychology [6]. Physical implementation of a quantum game could be very
hard, and experimental realization of such ideas as quantum auctions [13, 14] is a demanding technological
challenge, not to mention any commercial use. Fortunately, in some interesting cases no physical creation
of entanglement is necessary if one restrict oneself to phenomenological description or modeling of agent’s
behavior. There are suggestions that quantum games can outperform the ”classical” ones in description
of some interesting phenomena in economic theory or social sciences1 [6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18]. In this way,
quantum game theory has developed into an independent analytical tool that uses the sometimes possible
advantage of dealing with probability amplitudes instead of probabilities. The analysis of oligopolies has a
long history [19] and attempts at exploring quantum game theory to this field of research should not surprise
us. Most of the attention is focused on the duopoly theory hoping for more reliable modeling. The generally
accepted quantum scheme for these problems is due to Li et al. [20]. At present, one can find papers that
apply the Li–Du–Massar scheme to the Cournot duopoly problems [21, 22, 23] and the Stackelberg duopoly
[24, 25, 26]. There is also the study of quantum games concerning Bertrand duopoly examples [27, 28].
The motivation of writing this paper was twofold. One of the purposes is to extend the quantum game
theory based on the Li–Du–Massar scheme so that another type of duopoly has the quantum analogue. The
Bertrand duopoly in the form studied in the paper is an alternative model of the famous Cournot duopoly,
where the players compete in prices instead of quantities. This change makes it impossible to have a positive
equilibrium outcome in the Bertrand duopoly. Thus, it would be interesting to study this problem in the
quantum domain.
1We should stress here that quantum games are games in the standard sense and the reader should not assign any mysterious
contexts to the adjective quantum.
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On the other hand, our goal is to apply a method of determining Nash equilibria that is a new one with
respect to the quantum duopolies (whereas it is commonly used in the classical game theory). The Bertrand
duopoly example is determined by a piecewise payoff function. As a result, the payoff function in the
quantum game has similar form. It requires more sophisticated methods to find all the Nash equilibria than
ones appeared in the previous papers.
2 Bertrand duopoly problem
Let us recall the classical problem of Bertrand duopoly. There are two firms (players) who compete in the
price of a homogenous product. The demand q of the product is a function of the price, q(p) = max {a − p, 0}
for every p > 0. The firm with a lower price captures the entire market. If both firms charge the same price,
they split the market equally. We assume that each firm has the same marginal cost c such that 0 6 c < a.
If player 1 sets the price as p1 and player 2 sets the price as p2 the payoff function of player 1 is
u1(p1, p2) =

(p1 − c)(a − p1) if p1 < p2 and p1 6 a,
1
2(p1 − c)(a − p1) if p1 = p2 and p1 6 a,
0 if otherwise.
(1)
Similarly, the payoff function of player 2 is
u2(p1, p2) =

(p2 − c)(a − p2) if p2 < p1 and p2 6 a,
1
2(p2 − c)(a − p2) if p1 = p2 and p2 6 a,
0 if otherwise.
(2)
The Bertrand model [29] was proposed as an alternative to the Cournot model [30] in which the players
compete in quantities (see also [31] for more details about these two models). While it seems that the ratio-
nal players would obtain similar payoffs in both games, comparison of the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly
examples with respect to Nash equilibria exhibits a paradox. In the Cournot duopoly, the Nash equilibrium
payoff is (a − c)2/9. On the other hand, the game defined by (1)–(2) has the unique Nash equilibrium
(p∗1, p∗2) = (c, c) that arises from intersection of best reply functions β1(p2) and β2(p1),
β1(p2) =

{p1|p1 > p2} if p2 < c,
{p1|p1 > c} if p2 = c,
∅ if c < p2 6 a+c2 ,{
a+c
2
}
if p2 > a+c2 ,
(3)
β2(p1) =

{p2|p2 > p1} if p1 < c,
{p2|p2 > c} if p1 = c,
∅ if c < p1 6 a+c2 ,{
a+c
2
}
if p1 > a+c2 .
(4)
The equilibrium implies the payoff of 0 for both players.
3 Quantum Bertrand duopoly
In [32] we discussed two well-known quantum duopoly schemes [20, 33]. We pointed out that under some
condition the Li–Du–Massar scheme [20] appears to be more reasonable. In what follows, we apply that
scheme to Bertrand duopoly problem and study the resulting game with respect to Nash equilibria. Next,
we investigate the duopoly problem with the use of a simpler two-qubit scheme.
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3.1 The Li–Du–Massar approach to Bertrand duopoly
Let us recall the key elements of the Li–Du–Massar scheme that are needed to consider the Bertrand
duopoly. In the original paper [20], the quantities q1 and q2 in the quantum Cournot duopoly are deter-
mined by the measurements ˆX1 and ˆX2 on the final state |Ψ f 〉. Formally, the final state is of the form:
|Ψ f 〉 = ˆJ(γ)†( ˆD1(x1) ⊗ ˆD2(x2)) ˆJ(γ)|0〉1|0〉2, (5)
where
• ˆJ(γ) is the entangling operator,
ˆJ(γ) = e−γ(aˆ†1 aˆ†2−aˆ1aˆ2), (6)
• ˆD j(x j) for x j ∈ [0,∞) and j = 1, 2 are unitary operators
ˆD j(x j) = ex j(aˆ
†
j−aˆ j)/
√
2 (7)
that correspond to player j’s strategies,
• operators aˆ j and aˆ†j satisfy the following commutation relations:
[aˆi, aˆ†j] = δi j, [aˆ†i , aˆ†j] = [aˆi, aˆ j] = 0. (8)
Then the quantities q1 and q2 are obtained by formula
q1 ≡ 〈Ψ f | ˆX1|Ψ f 〉 = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ, (9)
q2 ≡ 〈Ψ f | ˆX2|Ψ f 〉 = x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ. (10)
In what follows, we provide the reader with detailed calculation needed to obtain (9). The same reasoning
applies to the case (10).
First, we recall the following operator relation that involves the function eA (see also [34]):
eλABe−λA = B cosh γ
√
β +
[A, B]√
β
sinh γ
√
β (11)
for operators A and B that satisfy [A, [A, B]] = βB, (β: constant). In a special case [A, B] = µ1 (µ: constant),
formula (11) leads to
eλABe−λA = B + λµ1. (12)
From (8) and (11) we have
ˆJ(γ)aˆ1 ˆJ†(γ) = aˆ1 cosh γ + aˆ†2 sinh γ. (13)
Thus, we have
ˆO1 ≡ ˆJ(γ) ˆX1 ˆJ†(γ) = ˆX1 cosh γ + ˆX2 sinh γ. (14)
Applying (12), we obtain
ˆD†i (xi)aˆ j ˆDi(xi) =

aˆi +
xi√
2
if i = j,
aˆ j if i , j,
(15)
for i, j = 1, 2. Therefore
ˆO2 ≡ ˆD†2(x2) ˆD†1(x1) ˆO1 ˆD1(x1) ˆD2(x2) = ( ˆX1 + x1) cosh γ + ( ˆX2 + x2) sinhγ. (16)
Since,
ˆJ†(γ)aˆi ˆJ(γ) = aˆi cosh γ − aˆ†j sinh γ, (17)
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for i, j = 1, 2 and i , j, we thus get
ˆO3 ≡ ˆJ†(γ) ˆO2 ˆJ(γ) = ˆX1 + x1 cosh γ + x2 sinhγ. (18)
According to the theory of quantization of the electromagnetic field, operators aˆi and aˆ†i satisfy relations
aˆi|n〉 =
√
n|n − 1〉, aˆ†i |n〉 =
√
n + 1|n + 1〉. (19)
Hence
〈0|1 ˆO3|0〉1 = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ. (20)
We now apply the Li–Du–Massar scheme to the Bertrand duopoly example. From a game-theoretical
point of view, the players 1 and 2 are to choose x1, x2 ∈ [0,∞), respectively. Then, the players’ prices
p1 and p2 are determined as functions pi : [0,∞)3 → [0,∞) of x1, x2 and a fixed entanglement parameter
γ ∈ [0,∞), 
p1(x1, x2, γ) = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ,
p2(x1, x2, γ) = x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ,
(21)
(see [20] and the papers [27, 28, 35] directly related to Bertrand duopoly-type problems for justifying
formula (21) in terms of quantum theory). Substituting (21) into (1) and (2) and noting that the sign of
p1(x1, x2, γ) − p2(x1, x2, γ) depends on the sign of x2 − x1 we obtain the following quantum counterpart of
(1) and (2):
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) =

(p1(x1, x2, γ) − c)(a − p1(x1, x2, γ)) if x1 < x2, p1(x1, x2, γ) 6 a,
1
2(p1(x1, x2, γ) − c)(a − p1(x1, x2, γ)) if x1 = x2, x1eγ 6 a,
0 if otherwise,
(22)
u
Q
2 (x1, x2) =

(p2(x1, x2, γ) − c)(a − p2(x1, x2, γ)) if x2 < x1, p2(x1, x2, γ) 6 a,
1
2(p2(x1, x2, γ) − c)(a − p2(x1, x2, γ)) if x1 = x2, x2eγ 6 a,
0 if otherwise.
(23)
Nash equilibrium analysis
In order to find all the Nash equilibria, we determine the best reply functions β1(x2) and β2(x1) and find
the points of intersection of the graphs of these functions. For γ = 0 we have p1(x1, x2, 0) = x1 and
p2(x1, x2, 0) = x2. Then β1(x2) and β2(x1) coincide with the classical best reply functions (3) and (4). We
thus assume that γ > 0.
Let us consider several cases to settle β1(x2).
1. If x2 < c/eγ, player 1 obtains a negative payoff by choosing x1 6 x2. Indeed,
x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ − c <
c
eγ
cosh γ + c
eγ
sinh γ − c = 0. (24)
and a− (x1 cosh γ + x2 sinhγ) > a − c > 0. Hence, according to (22), it is optimal for player 1 to take
x1 > x2. By a similar argument, if x2 = c/eγ, then any x1 < x2 yields player 1 a negative payoff. For
this reason, player 1’s best reply is x1 > c/eγ. In that case, player 1 obtains the payoff of 0.
2. Let us now consider the case c/eγ < x2 6 (a + c)/(2eγ). Note that
p1(x1, x2, γ) = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ = (a + c)/2 (25)
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maximizes expression
(p1(x1, x2, γ) − c)(a − p1(x1, x2, γ))
= (x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ − c)(a − (x1 cosh γ + x2 sinhγ)). (26)
Hence, if x2 = (a+ c)/(2eγ), term (26) as a function of variable x1 is maximized at x1 = (a+ c)/(2eγ).
However, equality x1 = x2 implies that the players split the payoff given by (26). Thus, player 1 would
benefit from choosing x1 slightly below x2. But then any x′1 in between x1 and x2 would yield a better
payoff. As a result, there is no best reply in this case. If c/eγ < x2 < (a + c)/(2eγ) then it follows
from (25) that expression (26) is maximized at point x1 > (a + c)/(2eγ) > x2. But by taking into
account payoff function (22), it would result in player 1’s payoff of 0. Thus, player 1 again obtains
more by choosing x1 slightly below x2. In the same manner as in case x2 = (a + c)/(2eγ) we can see
that the set of best responses of player 1 is empty when x2 < (a + c)/(2eγ).
3. If (a + c)/(2eγ) < x2 6 (a + c)/(2 sinh γ), then from the fact that x1 cosh γ + x2 sinhγ = (a + c)/2
maximizes (26) the player 1’s best reply is x1 = ((a + c)/2 − x2 sinh γ)/ cosh γ
4. If (a + c)/(2 sinhγ) < x2 < a/ sinhγ, function (26) of variable x1 is monotonically decreasing in
interval [0,∞). Hence, player 1 would obtain the highest payoff if x1 = 0.
5. For the case x2 > a/ sinhγ we have p1(x1, x2, γ) > a for any x1 ∈ [0,∞). It follows that uQ1 (x1, x2) = 0,
and then the set of best replies is [0,∞).
Summarizing, we obtain the following best reply function β1(x2):
β1(x2) =

{x1 : x1 > x2} if x2 < ceγ ,{
x1 : x1 >
c
eγ
}
ifx2 = ceγ ,
∅ if c
eγ
< x2 6
a+c
2eγ ,(
a+c
2 − x2 sinhγ
)
sech γ if a+c2eγ < x2 6
a+c
2 sinh γ ,
0 if a+c2 sinh γ < x2 <
a
sinh γ ,
[0,∞) if x2 > asinh γ .
(27)
Similar arguments to those above show that player 2’s best reply function β2(x1) is
β2(x1) =

{x2 : x2 > x1} if x1 < ceγ ,{
x2 : x2 >
c
eγ
}
if x1 = ceγ ,
∅ if c
eγ
< x1 6
a+c
2eγ ,(
a+c
2 − x1 sinhγ
)
sech γ if a+c2eγ < x1 6
a+c
2 sinh γ ,
0 if a+c2 sinh γ < x1 <
a
sinh γ
[0,∞) if x1 > asinh γ .
(28)
It is clear now that the players best reply functions β1(x2), β2(x1) for γ , 0 are more complex compared with
(3). If γ , 0, the best reply functions on interval ((a+ c)/(2eγ),∞) (being the counterpart of case xi > a+c2 if
γ = 0) are more specified, and take into account different intervals ((a + c)/(2eγ), (a + c)/(2 sinh γ)], ((a +
c)/(2 sinhγ), a/ sinhγ) and [a/ sinhγ,∞). This implies that new equilibria arise. Since a Nash equilibrium
in a two-person game is a strategy profile in which the strategies are mutually best replies, we can easily
determine the Nash equilibria by studying the points of intersection of β1(x2) and β2(x1) (see Fig 1 for the
graphs of β1(x2) and β2(x1)). An example of such a point is profile (c/eγ, c/eγ) that coincides with the
unique classical Nash equilibrium (c, c) in case γ = 0. Another and more interesting example is a profile
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Figure 1: Graphs of best reply functions (27) and (28).
(0, (a + c)/(2 sinh γ)) that implies the payoff profile ((a − c)2/4, 0) and has no counterpart in the classical
Cournot duopoly. It is a particular case of a general equilibrium profile
(
x1,
(
a + b
2
− x1 cosh γ
)
cschγ
)
for x1 ∈
[
0, c
eγ
]
. (29)
To see that this type of Nash equilibrium yields the payoff profile ((a − c)2/4, 0), note first that x1 6 c/eγ
implies eγx1 < a + c. From this we conclude
x1 <
(
a + c
2
− x1 cosh γ
)
cschγ = x2. (30)
As a result, player 2’s payoff is equal to zero and player 1’s payoff function uQ1 (x1, x2) comes down to
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) = (p1(x1, x2, γ) − c)(a − p1(x1, x2, γ)). (31)
Since
p1(x1, x2, γ) = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinhγ
= x1 cosh γ +
(
a + c
2
− x1 cosh γ
)
cschγ sinhγ
=
a + c
2
(32)
it follows that
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) =
1
4
(a − c)2. (33)
Similarly, the set of Nash equilibrium profiles
{
(0, x2), x2 ∈
(
a + c
2 sinhγ
,
a
sinhγ
)}
(34)
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Table 1: Nash equilibria in the game determined by (22) and (23) for γ , 0. They correspond to the points
of intersection of graphs of (27) and (28).
Nash equilibrium Payoff profile(
c
eγ
, c
eγ
)
(0, 0){(
x1,
(
a+c
2 − x1 cosh γ
)
cschγ
)
, x1 ∈
[
0, c
eγ
]} (
1
4(a − c)2, 0
)
{((
a+c
2 − x2 cosh γ
)
cschγ, x2
)
, x2 ∈
[
0, c
eγ
]} (
0, 14(a − c)2
)
{
(0, x2), x2 ∈
(
a+c
2 sinh γ ,
a
sinh γ
)}
((x2 sinhγ − c) (a − x2 sinhγ) , 0){
(x1, 0), x1 ∈
(
a+c
2 sinh γ ,
a
sinh γ
)}
(0, (x1 sinh γ − c) (a − x1 sinh γ)){
(x1, x2), x1 ∈
[
0, c
eγ
]
, x2 ∈
[
a
sinh γ ,∞
)}
(0, 0){
(x1, x2), x1 ∈
[
a
sinh γ ,∞
)
, x2 ∈
[
0, c
eγ
]}
(0, 0){
(x1, x2), x1 ∈
[
a
sinh γ ,∞
)
, x2 ∈
[
a
sinh γ ,∞
)}
(0, 0)
is more profitable for player 1. Since p1(x1, x2, γ) = x2 sinh γ and x2 < a/ sinhγ, we have p1(x1, x2, γ) < a.
Hence,
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) = (x2 sinhγ − c)(a − x2 sinh γ). (35)
Thus, there are continuum many nonclassical equilibria that favor player 1. Another part of equilibrium
profiles favors player 2 (see Table 1). Moreover, the great part of the equilibria implies payoff of 0 for each
player.
3.2 Bertrand duopoly with fully correlated quantities
We have known from the previous subsection that the Li–Du–Massar approach to the Bertrand duopoly
does not bring us closer to the unique and paretooptimal outcome. It results from similar structure of payoff
functions (22), (23) and (1), (2). In both cases, a unilateral (slight) deviation from profile (x, x) may yield
the player almost twice as high payoff. In this way, we cannot obtain a symmetric equilibrium that would
be profitable for both players. However, the correlation between prices can be defined in many different
ways. In paper [32], we introduced a simplified model that correlate the players choices x1, x2 ∈ [0,∞) in
the following way:
p′1(x1, x2, γ) = x1 cos2 γ + x2 sin2 γ, p′2(x1, x2, γ) = x2 cos2 γ + x1 sin2 γ, γ ∈
[
0, pi
4
]
. (36)
The value p′i for i = 1, 2 is obtained by formula p′i = tr(Mi(x1, x2)ρi) where
1. Mi(x1, x2) =

x1|0〉〈0| + x2|1〉〈1| if i = 1,
x2|0〉〈0| + x1|1〉〈1| if i = 2,
2. ρ1 and ρ2 are the reduced density operators tr2(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) and tr1(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|), respectively, and |Ψ〉 =
cos γ|00〉 + i sinγ|11〉.
It is clear from (36) that the correlation between x1 and x2 increases with increasing parameter γ. If γ = 0,
we obtain the classical Betrand duopoly. In the maximally entangled case, γ = pi/4, we have p′1 = p′2 = p′
and p′ equally depends on x1 and x2. We will show below that this case is crucial in obtaining paretooptimal
equilibria.
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Nash equilibrium analysis
Let us first consider the case γ ∈ (0, pi/4). Substituting (36) into (1) and (2) gives
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) =

(
p′1(x1, x2, γ) − c
) (
a − p′1(x1, x2, γ)
)
ifx1 < x2, p1(x1, x2, γ) 6 a,
1
2
(
p′1(x1, x2, γ) − c
) (
a − p′1(x1, x2, γ)
)
if x1 = x2, x1 6 a,
0 if otherwise,
(37)
u
Q
2 (x1, x2) =

(
p′2(x1, x2, γ) − c
) (
a − p′2(x1, x2, γ)
)
if x2 < x1, p2(x1, x2, γ) 6 a,
1
2
(
p′2(x1, x2, γ) − c
) (
a − p′2(x1, x2, γ)
)
if x1 = x2andx2 6 a,
0 if otherwise,
(38)
where we use the fact that inequalities p′1 < p′2 and x1 < x2 are equivalent for γ ∈ (0, pi/4). We see that
functions (37) and (38) have the same form as (22) and (23) up to the values pi. Hence, the method to find
β1(x2) and β2(x1) and then the Nash equilibria is similar to that used for (27) and (28). We obtain
β1(x2) =

{x1|x1 > x2} if x2 < c,
{x1|x1 > c} if x2 = c,
∅ if c < x2 6 a+c2 ,(
a+c
2 − x2 sin2 γ
)
cos−2 γ if a+c2 < x2 6
a+c
2 sin2 γ ,
0 if a+c2 sin2 γ < x2 <
a
sin2 γ ,
[0,∞) if x2 > asin2 γ .
(39)
Symmetric arguments apply to β2(x1),
β2(x1) =

{x2|x2 > x1} if x1 < c,
{x2|x2 > c} if x1 = c,
∅ if c < x1 6 a+c2 ,(
a+c
2 − x1 sin2 γ
)
cos−2 γ if a+c2 < x1 6
a+c
2 sin2 γ ,
0 if a+c2 sin2 γ < x1 <
a
sin2 γ ,
[0,∞) if x1 > asin2 γ .
(40)
The resulting Nash equilibria in the game are given in table 2. Comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows that
there is no new type of Nash equilibria in the game defined by (37) and (38).
The set of Nash equilibria changes if γ = pi/4. For any x1 and x2 we have
p′1(x1, x2, pi/4) = p′2(x1, x2, pi/4) = (x1 + x2)/2. (41)
Substituting p′i(x1, x2, pi/4) for i = 1, 2 into (1) and (2), respectively, we can rewrite (37) and (38) as
u
Q
1 (x1, x2) = uQ2 (x1, x2) =

1
2
(
x1+x2
2 − c
) (
a − x1+x22
)
if x1 + x2 6 2a
0 if x1 + x2 > 2a.
(42)
Note that function uQ1 (x1, x2) attains its maximum at x1 = a + c − x2 for fixed x2 ∈ [0, 2a). Player 1’s best
reply is therefore x1 = a + c − x2 if 0 6 x2 6 a + c and x1 = 0 for case a + c < x2 < 2a. If x2 > 2a, then
for any x1 ∈ [0,∞) player 1’s payoff is zero. As a result, player 1’s best reply function β1(x2) is given by
formula
β1(x2) =

a + c − x2 if x2 6 a + c,
0 i f a + c < x2 < 2a,
[0,∞) if x2 > 2a.
(43)
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Table 2: Nash equilibria in the game determined by (37) and (38) for γ ∈ (0, pi/4). They correspond to the
points of intersection of (39) and (40).
Nash equilibrium Payoff profile
(c, c) (0, 0){(
x1,
(
a+c
2 − x1 cos2 γ
)
sin−2 γ
)
, x1 ∈ [0, c]
} (
1
4(a − c)2, 0
)
{((
a+c
2 − x2 cos2 γ
)
sin−2 γ, x2
)
, x2 ∈ [0, c]
} (
0, 14(a − c)2
)
{
(0, x2), x2 ∈
(
a+c
2 sin2 γ ,
a
sin2 γ
)} ((
x2 sin2 γ − c
) (
a − x2 sin2 γ
)
, 0
)
{
(x1, 0), x1 ∈
(
a+c
2 sin2 γ ,
a
sin2 γ
)} (
0,
(
x1 sin2 γ − c
) (
a − x1 sin2 γ
))
{
(x1, x2), x1 ∈ [0, c] , x2 ∈
[
a
sin2 γ ,∞
)}
(0, 0){
(x1, x2), x1 ∈
[
a
sin2 γ ,∞
)
, x2 ∈ [0, c]
}
(0, 0){
(x1, x2), x1 ∈
[
a
sin2 γ ,∞
)
, x2 ∈
[
a
sin2 γ ,∞
)}
(0, 0)
Table 3: Nash equilibria in the game determined by (42).
Nash equilibrium Payoff profile
{(x1, x2), x1, x2 ∈ [2a,∞)} (0, 0)
{(x1, a + c − x1), x1 ∈ [0, a + c]} ((a − c)2/8, (a − c)2/8)
We conclude similarly that player 2’s best reply function β2(x1) is of the form
β2(x1) =

a + c − x1 if x1 6 a + c,
0 if a + c < x1 < 2a,
[0,∞) if x1 > 2a.
(44)
From intersection of (43) and (44) (see Fig 2), we conclude that there are two types of Nash equilibria. One
of the types is characterized by profiles (x1, x2) such that x1, x2 ∈ [2a,∞). In this case, each player’s payoff
is zero. The other one is what is desired. Each strategy profile (x1, x2), where x1 + x2 = a + c, constitutes a
Nash equilibrium and implies payoff (a − c)2/8 for both players. The payoff profile ((a − c)2/8, (a − c)2/8)
is paretooptimal since
max
p1,p2∈[0,∞)
(u1(p1, p2) + u2(p1, p2)) = (a − c)
2
4
, (45)
where ui(p1, p2) for i = 1, 2 are the payoff functions (1) and (2).
4 Conclusions
Our research has shown that the quantum approach to the Bertrand duopoly exhibits Nash equilibria that
are not available in the classical game. It has been proved that the Li–Du–Massar scheme does not imply
the unique and paretooptimal equilibrium outcome as is shown in the Cournot duopoly example. Instead,
we have the two equivalent types of Nash equilibria where, depending on the type, one of the players
obtains payoff (a − c)2/4 and the other one obtains zero payoff. On the other hand, we have shown that
it is possible to attain the symmetric paretooptimal equilibrium if the correlation between the players’
prices is defined in another way. If the players share the maximally entangled two-qubit state then with the
appropriately defined quantum scheme we obtain the symmetric and paretooptimal equilibrium outcome
9
Figure 2: Graphs of best reply functions (43) and (44).
((a−c)2/8, (a−c)2/8). Bertand doupoly, even though it is regarded as unrealistic, attracted a lot of attention
in the economic literature. We have shown that ”quantization” of the model substantially extends the class of
possible player behaviors and Nash equilibria. The above-mentioned paretooptimal equilibrium outcome
is exceptionally interesting. We do not claim that there are any quantum correlations among the agents.
But, from the phenomenological point of view, agent behaves as if some ”coordination” really occurs. This
probably means that there are big incentives to cooperate (collusion). We refrain from speculation on the
causes of such behavior [6, 7]. Our discussion is yet another argument for using the formalism of quantum
games in the analysis of the oligopoly modeling.
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